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Abstract 
 
Initially off to a slow start, European Union (EU) consular crisis management 
cooperation eventually developed as a response to exogenous factors. Given that 
guaranteeing the safety of one’s citizens is seen as one of the core responsibilities of the 
nation state, however, the EU’s Member States still seem reluctant to transfer this 
responsibility to the European level and the EU institutions. 
 
At times equated with propaganda, both the terminology and practice surrounding public 
diplomacy has received increased attention recently. Though not always labelled as such, 
public diplomacy efforts have gradually been stepped up by national foreign ministries 
and the EU institutions. 
 
                                                 
1 The author is Deputy Head of Press and Public Diplomacy at the Delegation of the European Commission 
to the U.S. This paper is submitted in a personal capacity and its contents do not necessarily reflect the 
views of the European Commission. 
2 The author would like to thank the following individuals for their valuable input and support: Nick Cull; 
Jan Melissen and Maaike Okano-Heijmans; Sverker Gustavsson; unnamed colleagues at the European 
Commission; Giorgio Porzio; Madelene Lindström; Steffen Bay Rasmussen. Against the backdrop of this renaissance for consular affairs and public diplomacy, the 
current study examines EU action in the field of consular crisis management cooperation 
as a means of EU public diplomacy, potentially affecting the alleged (internal) lack of 
support for the project of an ever closed Union among the EU citizens, as well as serving 
the EU’s public diplomacy purposes vis-à-vis foreign audiences. 
 
On the basis of legal provisions, budget allocations and proven action thus far in the field 
of public diplomacy efforts related to EU consular crisis management cooperation, a 
number of conclusions are suggested: 
 
According to existing legal provisions, there is considerable scope for EU efforts in this 
field. Though it could potentially later be challenged by Member States and/or other EU 
institutions, the so-called institutional prerogative – which is often used as the legal basis 
for budgetary commitments in the field of information and communications by the 
European Commission – could be applied also to EU public diplomacy efforts in this 
area, i.e. (increasingly) funded through the Community budget. 
 
Though the enabling legal conditions are in place, and a number of budget lines exist 
that could be used to this end, to date a very limited number of initiatives have been 
realised. 
 
Looking at existing data regarding public opinion and EU consular cooperation, it seems 
that EU citizens (though to a varying degree, depending on the EU Member State and 
other demographical variations) would welcome an increased role for the EU in the 
area. 
 
Regarding public diplomacy, recent developments cannot be confined to the EU alone, 
but tend to be part of a broader trend which can be labelled the “societization” of 
traditional diplomacy, characterised by closer links between diplomacy and society. 
 
In terms of the limits of EU consular crisis management cooperation as a means of EU 
public diplomacy, constraints include the issue of responsibility, the distribution of credit 
and blame, national sensitivities, and differences in Member States’ resources and 
representation. 
 
Finally, arguing that the potential for European efforts in the field of consular crisis 
management as a tool of effective EU public diplomacy (both within the Union and 
outside) is great, it is surprising that not more attention is given to the area – especially 
in light of the Commission’s discourse on delivering tangible benefits to the EU’s 
citizens. To move from action as a mere response to exogenous factors to a situation 
where it is part of an EU policy of deliberate public diplomacy, the Union still has a long 
way to go. KEYWORDS 
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Every citizen of the European Union is entitled to the consular protection of any 
Member State's diplomatic or consular representation […] The diplomatic and 
consular representations approached shall respond to the request for protection by the 
person concerned […]. 
Decision 95/553/EC, Articles 1 and 2 
 
 
[I]t is impossible really to get an accurate picture of the number of casualties from 
where I am. […] There are no kind of emergency services here, there are no 
helicopters thumping through the sky to come to save people. It is a do-it-yourself 
rescue. 
Eyewitness of the Asian tsunami, quoted by BBC 
 
 
 [P]ublic opinion is the medium in which we now operate. All diplomacy is therefore 
public diplomacy. 
James Traub in The New York Times Magazine article “Persuading Them” PART I. INTRODUCTION 
 
1. A Renaissance for Consular Affairs and an Awakening for Public Diplomacy  
 
Three trends are currently happening simultaneously: 
 
The role of diplomacy is changing: Traditionally characterised by secret negotiations 
between governments behind closed doors, diplomacy and global events in the 21
st 
century are carefully scrutinised 24/7 by journalists and other actors not hesitating to hold 
politicians and governments accountable.
3 
 
People travel more and further away: EU citizens alone make some 80 million trips per 
year to third countries, around nine percent – or seven million – of whom go to countries 
where their Member State does not have a consular of diplomatic representation. 
Additionally, approximately two million EU expatriates live in a third country where 
their Member State is not represented. When major crises happen – such as the Asian 
tsunami of 2004, the Bali bombings of 2005, and the Lebanon evacuations of 2006 – 
travellers in large numbers are affected.
4 
 
Citizens’ expectations are rising. With the media giving attention to human interest issues 
that attract voters and readers, public opinion and support can quickly sway if the 
government is perceived to not ‘do something about it.’
5 One of the combined effects of 
                                                 
3 Several researchers have suggested this, inter alia Jönsson (2002) and Melissen (2006). 
4 European Commission (2007c). 
5 See inter alia Heijmans and Melissen (2006), p. 1. globalisation and the late 20
th century communication revolution is global networks that 
transcend national boundaries and a more activist civil society.
6 
 
But what are the reasons behind these trends? Why has consular affairs and emergency 
response seen a renaissance? And why now? After all, natural disasters are not new, nor 
is the importance of how the government handles them or – and of greater importance – 
how the government is seen to handle them; Juan Peron’s rise to power in Argentina was 
largely based on earthquake response,
7 and U.S. President George W. Bush and his 
administration received massive criticism for its handling (or lack thereof) of the 
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in 2005.
8 
 
Some suggestions exist: 
 
According to various scholars and practitioners, the change of focus of diplomacy has 
happened gradually over the course of the last 15￿20 years, and as a result of a 
fundamentally altered power equation in the international system. This would be a 
consequence of the end of the Cold War, the 9/11 attacks, and rapidly emerging new 
economic powers, which in turn carry the risk of diminishing the geopolitical and 
geostrategic significance of small and middle-sized countries.
9 Attractiveness means 
maximising the flow of inward investment and drawing skilled immigrants to keep and 
improve a country’s competitiveness.
10 “[T]he combined forces of globalization and the 
democratization of access to information are changing the environment in which public 
diplomacy operates”, as Gonesh and Melissen put it.
11 Three additional – and linked – 
factors recur in work trying to explain this shift: transparency, accountability, and 
integrity. Transparency, first of all, because the public demands much higher levels of 
transparency, recognising that this is necessary to make decisions, for example whether to 
                                                 
6 Melissen (2008), p. 3. 
7 Brookings Institution (2008), p. 17. 
8 See inter alia Bumiller (2005). 
9 Gonesh and Melissen (2005), p. 3. 
10 Langhorn (2008), p. 59. 
11 Gonesh and Melissen (2005), p. 5. invest in a country. Accountability, secondly, is due to the fact that providing information 
is not enough; a firm commitment to accountability among government officials could 
strengthen the demanded credibility, which often is identified as needed for successful 
public diplomacy. Integrity, thirdly, is considered required for the first two to function 
effectively, because what matters in the end is individuals “doing the right thing”.
12 
 
Additionally, the blurring of public diplomacy (external dimension) and public affairs 
(domestic dimension) is due to several factors: Government alone can no longer resolve 
the foreign policy problems of the twenty-first century; citizens yearn for greater 
government accountability and transparency; and foreign policy and domestic policy are 
increasingly intertwined.
13 And, as observed by Gonesh and Melissen, “When an issue is 
not directly addressed […] [t]hey may attract the media’s attention […], and thus the 
issue moves from one of citizen and media concern to one of political importance.”
14 
 
It has even been suggested that public diplomacy is part of a wider phenomenon or an 
expression of broader patterns of change in diplomacy, which could be characterised as 
the ‘societization’ of diplomacy, the idea that we are witnessing a tightening link between 
diplomacy and diplomacy.
15 
 
Given that the support for European integration is weak among its own citizens,
16 the EU 
is in search of a new narrative. The European Commission has repeatedly stated that the 
EU must prove its added value, and in its Annual Work Programme for 2009 – 
symptomatically called Acting now for a better Europe –, it stresses that its priority is to 
bring direct benefits to its citizens.
17 But what can the EU do that might have a positive 
                                                 
12 Gonesh and Melissen (2005c), pp. 22￿23. 
13 Gonesh and Melissen (2005), p. 6. 
14 Gonesh and Melissen (2005b), p. 14. 
15 Melissen (2006), p. 7. 
16 According to recent polls, 53 percent of Europeans still support EU membership, but 15 percent consider 
their country’s membership in the EU as a bad thing, and 27 percent believe it is “neither good nor bad”. 
European Commission (2008d), p. 31. 
17 European Commission (2008b), p. 2. influence on people’s lives and prove that An Ever Closer Union is still relevant and 
desirable? 
 
Several major crises in recent years have had a considerable impact in some EU Member 
States; over 500 Swedish and German lives were lost in the 2004 Asian tsunami, and the 
Lebanon crisis in the summer of 2006 triggered the biggest evacuation of British, Danish 
and Swedish citizens since World War II.
18 If consular crisis management cooperation on 
an EU level would prove to be more efficient than EU Member States assisting their own 
citizens individually, could this be an effective EU public diplomacy tool which would 
influence public opinion, both within the Union and outside? If so, provided that the job 
is done right and perceived as such, could “Europe Aid” move the needle in terms of the 
EU’s popularity? 
 
Though there is an abundance of existing research in the fields of public diplomacy, 
(nation) branding, crisis communication, and (to a lesser extent) consular crisis 
management, respectively, very little seems to exist that combine the different fields. 
This is quite surprising, not the least given the increasing interest in both public 
diplomacy and citizens’ expectations in terms of consular crisis assistance. Or, as 
Melissen – who is one of very few who has connected the areas – puts it: “In these two 
fields of diplomatic work people are beginning to look like consumers and in public 
diplomacy as much as in consular affairs the MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] is 
actually delivering a product. In both fields of activity the MFA is also confronted with 
the issues of image and reputation: public diplomacy is about the management of the 
country’s image and consular affairs may directly affect the image of the MFA itself.”
19 
 
                                                 
18 Regarding British citizens, see Evans (2006); regarding Danish citizens, see ‘Evakuering’ (2009); 
regarding Swedish citizens, see Undevik (2009). 
19 Melissen (2006), p. 7. This is an attempt to start changing the lack of research, and the author hopes that the 
present study can be a building block in the process. 
 
 
1.2 Purpose, Structure and Academic Contribution 
 
This paper has three main purposes: 
 
1. First, to briefly outline the development and current state of European Union (EU) 
consular crisis or emergency management cooperation as articulated in Art. 20 TEC, 
according to which “Every citizen of the Union shall, in the territory of a third country in 
which the Member State of which he is a national is not represented, be entitled to 
protection by the diplomatic or consular authorities of any Member State, on the same 
conditions as the nationals of that State. Member States shall establish the necessary rules 
among themselves and start the international negotiations required to secure this 
protection.”
20 
 
2. Second, to attempt to summarise EU public diplomacy efforts in general – with a focus 
on the external dimension (though the border between the internal and external 
dimensions tend to be blurred; for a brief discussion on public diplomacy versus public 
affairs and the ‘intermestic’ nature of the EU, please see chapter 1.4 Definitions, 
Limitations and Potential Bias). What is currently being done? What is the institutional 
set-up? What resources are available? 
 
3. Third – against the findings in descriptive parts one and two ￿, to look at consular 
crisis management cooperation as a means of EU public diplomacy: What would it mean 
and what are its limits? To make this assessment, we will analyse four factors in terms of 
                                                 
20 European Union (2006), p. 50. public diplomacy activities as applied to EU consular crisis management cooperation: (i) 
What do legal provisions say? (ii) How much resources are committed, in terms of 
budgets available? (iii) What is currently being done? and (iv) What do public opinion 
polls suggest? 
 
The proposed structure broadly follows the three purposes: While the first part of this 
thesis covers its purpose, methodology, and discusses definitions, limitations and 
potential bias, the second part comprises an overview of EU consular crisis management 
cooperation and EU public diplomacy activities in general. The third part is an analysis of 
EU consular crisis management cooperation as a means of EU public diplomacy, as 
analysed through legal provisions, available budget, and existing initiatives, including a 
critical view of what we know about public opinion and what conditions would need to 
be fulfilled for activities in this field to ‘move the needle’. Finally, in our concluding part, 
we will suggest a number of observations based on our findings. 
 
In terms of academic contribution, the strength of this paper is neither its brief description 
of the EU’s cooperation and institutional set-up in terms of consular crisis management, 
nor its (non-exhaustive) overview of EU public diplomacy efforts in general. Instead, the 
author hopes to bring these two areas of research closer together, and investigate what 
consular crisis management cooperation as a means of EU public diplomacy would mean, 
including its potential and limits. At present, the linkage has only been done in a very 
limited number of studies – and in no case applied to the area of EU consular crisis 
management cooperation.
21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 As far as the author knows, only Professor Jan Melissen and Research Fellow Maaike Okano-Heijmans 
at the Clingendael Institute in the Netherlands have brought the two areas together in a structured manner. 1.3 Methodology 
 
As outlined above, this thesis has three main purposes. Given the slightly different nature 
of the three parts, the methodology chosen is somewhat varied for each of the three 
segments: 
 
For the first part – a description of the development and current state of European Union 
(EU) consular crisis management cooperation as articulated in Art. 20 TEC –, we will use 
existing research. Given the EU’s role in consular crisis management and European 
Union cooperation in the field is relatively limited, and that amendments to the 
institutional set-up might have happened in recent time, our aim was initially to find 
material which was as up to date as possible. In case of a need to complement scholarly 
work, we had the intention to carry out interviews with key actors (in Brussels and, 
possibly, in a number of capitals of the EU Member States). Thanks to Madelene 
Lindström’s generous sharing of her still unpublished findings, however, our material is 
most topical and updated and interviews were deemed unnecessary for this brief, 
descriptive overview. 
 
In terms of the second part – an attempt to summarise what is currently being done in 
terms of EU public diplomacy activities in general – there is not an indefinite number of 
sources. The perhaps most comprehensive overviews to date – Fiske De Gouveia’s and 
Plumridge’s European Infopolitik: Developing EU Public Diplomacy Strategy and the 
EPC-commissioned working paper by Dov Lynch (Communicating Europe to the world: 
what public diplomacy for the EU?) which were both published in November 2005 – we 
therefore considered as our main sources, in addition to relevant core documents 
produced by the Council of the European Union and the European Commission. This 
initial list of readings was eventually supplemented primarily by Steffen Bay 
Rasmussen’s The images and practices of EU public diplomacy, from 2008. Though we 
in no way claim that our sources are exhaustive, we would like to believe that they cover 
the domain satisfactorily and are adequately up to date. 
 Looking at our third part, finally – an analysis of consular crisis management cooperation 
as a means of EU public diplomacy ￿, we will go to the sources: To make our 
assessment, we will analyse four factors in terms of public diplomacy activities as applied 
to EU consular crisis management cooperation: (i) What do legal provisions say? (ii) 
How much resources are committed, in terms of budgets available? (iii) What is currently 
being done? and (iv) What do public opinion polls suggest? The methodology chosen is, 
we believe, intuitive and logical: In terms of legal provisions, we will look at the legal 
basis for relevant public diplomacy activities (i.e. applied to the studied area); regarding 
budgetary resources, we will explore the most recently available general budget of the 
European Union, and discuss what budget lines might be employed for this purpose; in 
terms of action underway or already undertaken, we will conduct research and – based on 
this – crosscheck our findings against key actors in this field who are likely to be aware 
of (other potential) EU initiatives in this field; finally, when taking a critical look at what 
we know about this field, we will utilise available public opinion data. 
 
 
1.4 Definitions, Limitations and Potential Bias 
 
First of all, three (normative) caveats are motivated: 
 
A ‘diplomacy of deeds’ – meaning to help (the world) – is sometimes dismissed by critics 
who see it as a means to impress audiences abroad (and voters at home) by showing how 
kind and generous a country or donor is.
22 If we were to adopt this point of view, any 
‘good’ deeds would be the subject of ridicule and distrust and hence their value declared 
null and void. Instead, we argue, one can and should (still) do good, i.e. help individuals 
in distress (though according to clearly defined conditions and norms and ideally in line 
with the recipient’s realistic level of anticipation), and in doing this the actor can prove 
her value; getting credit can only be achieved when deserved. 
 
                                                 
22Brown (2007). Second, it should be absolutely clear that consular emergency assistance is provided first 
and foremost on the basis of a need to assist our (EU or national, depending on the 
context and point of view) citizens; public diplomacy or public affairs concerns can only 
come further down the list. In other words: We should not provide emergency assistance 
because we think we are going to benefit from it, but because it is the right thing to do 
(and, in the case of consular assistance – though at different levels and differently defined 
in various states – sometimes a legal obligation). But given the increased interest in and 
focus on consular crisis or emergency relief, and a perceived need for the EU to gain a 
better reputation and show tangible results with the European citizens (and abroad), it 
would be a lost opportunity not to factor the public diplomacy/public affairs dimension 
in. 
 
Third, a crucial assumption is being made in this study: Though not very realistic, we will 
take (existing) EU consular crisis management cooperation as a given, i.e. treat it as an 
independent factor. What does this mean? Though it could be argued that how the EU 
manages a consular crisis – and is seen to handle it – is likely to affect how EU citizens 
(and possibly constituencies outside the Union) perceive the EU at least as much as any 
number of, say, posters and TV ads would, by design we choose to disregard this factor 
in the present study. The reason is simply that the opposite choice would change the 
focus of our research, and would require us to make a qualitative assessment of how the 
EU’s consular crisis management cooperation would work in a hypothetical situation. 
This is not very feasible, at least not within the given framework, but the limits this puts 
on our conclusions will have to be kept in mind. 
 
In a restricted study like this, time and space limitations unfortunately do not allow for 
several aspects to be included – regardless of their importance – and a number of 
clarifications are called for: 
 
In terms of EU management and cooperation in the field of consular affairs, please note 
that the focus will be on crisis or emergency management cooperation, i.e. when urgent 
help is needed in times of an acute crisis affecting a large number of persons, rather than on the day-to-day business of consular affairs (for example individuals losing their 
passport).
23 
 
There is an ongoing debate about public diplomacy and the terminology surrounding it, 
its similarity to or difference from propaganda, branding and public affairs, its 
usefulness, etc. Although we originally drafted a comprehensive chapter on this topic, for 
reasons of lack of space and in order to keep the study focused, we eventually decided to 
discard it. Instead, we will limit ourselves to say that public affairs and public diplomacy 
is not the same thing, and that in the United States there is even a legal barrier between 
the two. Even if we believe that a clear distinction is needed between what is done 
domestically and what is undertaken internationally, both in terms of theory and 
accountability, in this study we will not employ a strictly separate application of public 
affairs and public diplomacy. Though aware of and recognising the difference between 
the two, given the increasingly ‘intermestic’ nature of society (not the least within the 
European Union),
24 and for reasons of simplification, we will utilise the following 
working definition of public diplomacy, as applied both vis-à-vis foreign audiences and 
                                                 
23 This being said, a water-proof division between the two is however difficult to achieve, due to the 
progressive nature of consular affairs; one example would be a situation in which an individual consular 
case (in a ‘normal situation’) escalates – perhaps through the attention of media – and becomes the focus of 
high-level bilateral negotiations. But for reasons of simplicity in this restricted study, we will assume a 
quite clear division is possible to achieve. 
24 The term ‘intermestic’ is an abbreviation of the words ‘international’ and ‘domestic’, and represents a 
kind of strategic management approach in the field of international affairs which views the spheres of 
domestic and international spheres as equally important. It is often applied to understand U.S. foreign-
policy making, for example, in analysing the relationship between the Administration and Congress. In 
Europe, former UK Minister for Europe Denis MacShane has repeatedly stated that Europe is now 
governed by intermestic politics: “Our domestic problems can no longer be solved politically within 
national frontiers. Foreign or European ministers like myself now have to think in intermestic terms too. 
Long gone are the days when diplomats and foreign policy specialists could negotiate treaties or do deals 
without reference to domestic constituencies.” MacShane (2003).  In the increasingly blurred domestic and 
international world that European Union policy-making constitutes, we believe the approach useful in the 
current study. 
 
Theoretically, the intermestic notion is directly linked to Robert D. Putnamn’s two-level game theory, 
according to which “The politics of many international negotiations is conceived as a two-level game. At 
the national level, domestic groups pursue their interest by pressuring the government to adopt favorable 
policies, and politicians seek power by constructing coalition among those groups. At the international 
level, national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while 
minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign development. Neither of the two games can be ignored by 
central decision makers, so long as their countries remain interdependent, yet sovereign.” Putnam (1988), p. 
434. the internal constituencies of the Union: “Getting other people on one’s side.”
25 ‘One’ in 
this case is ‘the EU’ (however defined or understood), given that ‘the perception of the 
EU’ would be the dependent variable in any effort to ‘move the needle’.
26 This working 
definition will be complemented by a brief overview of what is done in terms of EU 
public diplomacy activities in general, which will hopefully clarify what the term might 
mean on a practical level. 
 
Though this thesis will touch upon private actors and their increasing involvement in 
public diplomacy, we will focus on the role of state actors, namely governments and the 
European Union’s institutions more specifically. More distinctively, when discussing ‘the 
EU’ – both in terms of EU consular crisis management cooperation and EU public 
diplomacy –, we will focus on the Council of the European Union (including its General 
Secretariat) and the European Commission; the European Parliament has been excluded 
for lack of time and space, whereas the role of Member States only is referred to in a 
limited manner, mainly in chapter 2.1 EU Consular Crisis Management Cooperation: A 
Brief Overview, and only mentioned in passing in chapter 2.3 EU Public Diplomacy: A 
Summary. 
 
Scholarly work regarding public diplomacy at times deal raises questions about the 
institutional set-up of public diplomacy, i.e. where the function of public diplomacy best 
can be guaranteed in the design of an institution or agency. This issue will only be 
touched upon very briefly here. Nor will this study focus on another huge challenge in 
terms of public diplomacy, namely how to assess the impact of public diplomacy 
activities. 
 
The increasing importance of consular affairs at times includes the less positive effects of 
increased traveling and more open borders, namely the increase in cross-border crime 
such as smuggling, violence, illegal immigration and human trafficking;
27 though these 
                                                 
25 Melissen (2006), p. 2. 
26 It has also been suggested that the public diplomacy of a federal structure is of special significance, in 
that it is two-faced: Facing inwards and outwards at the same time. See inter alia Potter (2002). 
27 Manojlovic and Thorheim (2007), p. 15. aspects of consular affairs might at times perhaps amount to ‘crises’, they will not be 
covered in this study. 
 
Though we might briefly touch upon the issue of legitimacy, or lack thereof, of European 
Union decision-making, this will only be mentioned in passing and as a back-drop to the 
present study; the debate surrounding the alleged lack of support for the European 
integration project will continuously linger in the background but cannot be given its own 
place here. 
 
Something also needs to be said about the choice of terminology or wording: Why 
‘consular crisis management cooperation’ rather than ‘consular crisis assistance’? After 
having giving this matter a lot of thought, it was decided to use the former, the main 
reason being that the focus should be on the management of the consular crisis and how 
the different EU actors cooperate, including how this is linked to public diplomacy 
activities of these efforts, rather than on the provided assistance itself. 
 
As interesting as it would be, given the lack of clarity surrounding the status of the 
Lisbon Reform Treaty and its provisions on the establishment of the European External 
Action Service (EEAS) at the time of writing, its possible impact on EU consular crisis 
management cooperation as a means of EU public diplomacy has to be excluded from 
this study; we will instead base our study on the legal framework currently in place. 
 
Additional limitations apply to the chapter 3.1.2 Budgetary Resources; since these are 
mainly of a technical nature, they are instead specified in the chapter in question. 
 
Given the author’s intimate involvement in (EU) Public Diplomacy, his independence 
might be questioned and a bias perhaps assumed. It should, however, be noted that the 
author is also on leave of absence from the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and 
though formally any employee of the European Commission should neither take nor seek 
instructions from any government, it could also be argued that the MFA employment 
might constitute a bias in favour of an intergovernmentalist/Member State or even Swedish perspective. The author claims that he can separate between his professional 
roles and his academic responsibility, and the two hats might instead provide further 
argument for a balanced view. Finally, this study should be seen as an individual 
contribution in no way associated with the European Commission or the Swedish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the author assumes full responsibility for its contents. PART II. EU CONSULAR CRISIS MANAGEMENT COOPERATION AND EU 
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 
 
2.1 EU Consular Crisis Management Cooperation: A Brief Overview 
 
Providing consular services have traditionally been the responsibility of individual states. 
This is true also for the European Union, though the nature and scope of consular services 
vary considerably between the EU Member States. While some countries recognise the 
right to consular services under law, others do not; and where some Member States 
charge evacuated citizens for an evacuation, others do not.
28 Inside the European Union, 
all 27 Member States are represented in all other states. In other words, any EU citizen 
can seek consular assistance of his or her country from its Embassy and/or consulate in 
any given EU country.
29 Outside the Union, however, all Member States are represented 
in only three capitals: Washington, Beijing, and Moscow. In 18 countries outside of the 
Union, no Member State is represented, and in 17 countries only one Member State is 
represented.
30 
 
The European dimension of consular affairs has a brief history: Though the European 
Convention on Consular Functions and its Protocols have been open to signature by all 
EU Member States since the Convention was established in 1967, it has received little 
attention – not the least since consular privileges, immunities, and relations were covered 
already by the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963.
31 This changed with 
the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, which introduced what is commonly known as the 
second and third pillars of the Union: the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP); 
and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA, later changed to JLS for Justice, Liberty and 
Security). Flanking the second pillar, the Treaty of Maastricht also introduced the notion 
                                                 
28 Lindström (2009), p. 4. 
29Ibid, p. 1. 
30 European Commission (2007d). 
31 Heijmans and Melissen (2007), p. 14. of “European citizenship”, which could have remained an empty notion had it not been 
for article 8c of the Treaty,
32 which states that: 
 
Every citizen of the Union shall, in the territory of a third country in which 
the Member State of which he is a national is not represented, be entitled to 
protection by the diplomatic or consular authorities of any Member State, 
on the same conditions as the nationals of that State. Member States shall 
establish the necessary rules among themselves and start the international 
negotiations required to secure this protection.
33 
 
As Porzio has pointed out, the establishment of the necessary rules to implement the 
provision was left to the Member States, and not to the European Commission or the 
Union.
34 Though the text was introduced in 1992, it would take three years until the EU 
countries arrived at a common decision (95/553/EC), which is considered by many to be 
“a defining point in consular assistance and protection”.
35 
 
As important as decision 95/553/EC may be, however, it is a very brief document – and 
one which has received criticism for its careful approach: “The one page decision seems 
as anxious to avoid financial assistance, and to guarantee full repayment in cases of 
extreme distress, as to alleviate suffering.”
36 
 
Despite the brevity of the decision, it would take another six and a half years before it 
actually came into force: After a long process of ratification by the then 15 Member 
States, the decision was enacted on 3 May 2002. 
 
                                                 
32 Porzio (2008), p. 93. 
33 Article 8c of the Treaty of Maastricht became Article 20 (TEC) under the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, 
and will henceforth be referred to as Art. 20. 
34 Porzio (2008), p. 94. Three conditions have to be fulfilled for an EU citizen to be entitled to this consular 
protection: (i) The absence of an Embassy, a Consulate General or Consulate of the citizen's own Member 
State in the third country in which the citizen requests protection; (ii) the absence of an accessible Honorary 
Consul competent for such matters of the own Member State or another state representing it on a permanent 
basis; and (iii) the citizen requesting protection has to show a passport, identity card or other document as a 
proof of his or her nationality. European Commission (2007b). 
35 Porzio (2008), p. 94. Council Decision 95/553/EC. 
36 Grahn (2008). The timing of the final ratification is not a coincidence: Until the terrorist attacks of 11 
September 2001 in the United States (9/11), Art. 20 had been a theoretical model, 
basically translating what already happened on the ground via bilateral agreements 
between EU Member States. In cases of stranded families and airplane crashes, mutual 
assistance and cooperation dealt with a relatively limited number of individuals. 9/11 
made it clear that thousands of EU citizens may be affected at the same time.
37 
 
The 9/11 attacks were followed by a succession of events which made it clear that not 
even the best, most all-encompassing and most resourceful consular services could cope 
on their own:
38 The Bali bombings (12 October 2002), the tsunami in South-East Asia 
(26 December 2004), the Sharm-el Sheik bombings (23 July 2005), Hurricane Katrina 
(August 2005), and the Lebanon evacuation (July￿August 2006). The evacuation from 
Lebanon was, for several EU countries, the biggest evacuation of their own citizens since 
the Second World War.
39 
 
In terms of institutional set-up within the EU system, consular cooperation falls under the 
CFSP pillar with matters of consular cooperation being handled by the General Affairs 
and External Relations Council (GAERC).
40 At working group level, consular issues are 
dealt with by the Consular Cooperation Working Party (COCON), established in 1993 
but which for many years remained a “club of port and cigars”.
41 The Council also hosts 
the European Joint Situation Centre (SitCen), which plays the most prominent role 
assisting the rotating Presidency of the EU or the designed so-called Lead State.
42 Within 
the European Commission, two Directorates-General (DGs) are involved in consular 
affairs: the DG for Justice, Liberty and Security (DG JLS), and the DG for External 
                                                 
37 Porzio (2008), p. 94. 
38 Ibid. 
39 This is true for at least the UK, Denmark and Sweden. Regarding British citizens, see Evans (2006); 
regarding Danish citizens, see ‘Evakuering’ (2009); regarding Swedish citizens, see Undevik (2009). 
40 Lindström (2009/forthcoming), p. 4. 
41 Heijmans and Melissen (2007), p. 14. 
42 Porzio (2008), p. 96. The Lead State concept aims to protect EU citizens in crisis situations particularly 
in third countries where some Member States do not have any representation. It is the role of the Lead State 
to coordinate measures for the protection of EU citizens during a crisis for example by providing 
information to citizens on site and to responsible authorities in capitals, as well as to coordinate an 
evacuation if necessary. The concept was first put into practice in Chad in January 2008 (with France as the 
designated Lead State). Lindström (2009/forthcoming), pp. 9￿10. Relations (DG Relex). In terms of aspects pertaining to European citizenship and 
consular protection by Member States, DG JLS is the department taking the lead, 
whereas it is DG Relex for matters of consular protection outside the Union, in practice 
related to support given by Delegations in consular crises.
43 
 
In parallel to the crises mentioned above and in their search for closer cooperation, the 
COCON group began drafting guidelines and a best practice code.
44 Successive 
guidelines were established between 2000 and 2007, where the consular working group’s 
approach was of sharing information, contingency planning, and – “when possible” – 
resources.
45 These guidelines are not legally binding, even if it has been claimed that 
recent crises have given them a “special status”, as all Member States follow them.
46 In 
addition to Decision 95/553/EC, the only other legal instrument within the area of 
consular cooperation on an EU level was established in 1996, when EU Member States 
agreed on a uniform format for an emergency travel document (“ETD”; 96/409/CFSP). 
An ETD is a document which can be issued in case of loss, destruction or theft of a 
passport while travelling, and allows the holder to undertake a single journey to the 
Member State of which s/he is a national, to his/her country of residence or, in 
exceptional cases, to another destination.
47 
 
At times, a distinction is made between four different phases of a crisis – the prevention 
phase, the preparation phase, the response phase, and the recovery phase – though for 
reasons of limitations we will here focus only on the response phase: 
 
As Porzio has pointed out, both the European Commission and the Council Secretariat 
have a clear advantage over Member States – not having citizens to assist. This means 
that the role of EU institutions in times of crises in general is to “assist Member States to 
assist their citizens”. In practice, this is limited to providing help with logistics, such as 
                                                 
43 European Commission (2009). Though outside the scope of this study, the European Parliament also 
covers these issues. This is done through its Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs. 
Lindström (2009/forthcoming), p. 4. 
44 Porzio (2008), p. 94. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Porzio (2006), p. 4. 
47 European Commission (1996). premises, transportation and communications.
48 If worst comes to worst and an 
evacuation is deemed necessary, Member States have to rely on their own individual 
contributions, i.e. no common EU resources like strategic transport capacity are 
available.
49 In certain cases, however, Member States may offer personnel but lack the 
means to bring these to where they are needed. If so, Member States can request the 
activation of the Community Mechanism for Civil Protection, which is forwarded by the 
Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) to a network of national contact points. These 
contact points assess their available resources and inform the MIC whether they are in a 
position to help.
50 
 
Though limited, the last three years have seen a number of proposals and initiatives to 
strengthen EU consular cooperation in terms of crisis management – ranging from minor 
to more ambitious suggestions: 
 
•  In the spring of 2006, the Austrian Presidency of the EU and the European 
Commission asked former European Commissioner Michel Barnier to draft a 
report that, though concentrating on civil protection issues at the European level, 
also included consular aspects and, inter alia, proposed the establishment of 
common European consulates;
51 
•  On 28 November 2006, the European Commission adopted a Green Paper on 
diplomatic and consular protection of European Union citizens in third countries, 
containing a wide range of proposals;
52 
•  In December 2006, the Finish Presidency presented a “Report on Reinforcing the 
European Union’s emergency and crisis response capacities”;
53 
                                                 
48 Porzio (2008), p. 96. 
49 Lindström (2009/forthcoming), p. 10. 
50 European Commission (2007h). Given that the network was initially used to assist in cases of 
environmental disasters, the MIC is managed by the Directorate-General for Environment of the European 
Commission.  Council Decision 2001/792/EC, Euratom (2001). The relevant text states that its aim is “to 
help ensure better protection, primarily of people but also of the environment and property, including 
cultural heritage, in the event of major emergencies, i.e. natural, technological, radiological or 
environmental accidents occurring inside or outside the Community, including accidental marine 
pollution.” (Article 1.2). 
51 Barnier (2006), p. 24; Porzio (2008), p. 95. 
52 European Commission (2006). •  Later the same month, High Representative for the CFSP Javier Solana and the 
European Commission presented a report to the European Council, specifically 
aimed at closer consular cooperation;
54 
•  On 29 May 2007, the European Commission organised a public hearing on its 
Green Paper of November 2006;
55 
•  In June 2007, a proposal by France and the UK was formalised into a concept on 
the role of a Lead State during consular crises;
56 
•  On 5 December 2007, on the basis of its Green Paper and reactions received 
through the public consultation, the European Commission presented its Action 
Plan 2007￿2009, a “non-exhaustive roadmap” for measures the Commission 
intends to propose during these three years. Proposals for consular protection of 
EU citizens were among its top priorities for 2008, and the European Commission 
is currently planning to conduct a survey of Member States’ experiences of 
consular cooperation among EU missions in third countries;
57 
•  6 May 2008, the European Commission published a Recommendation to 
reproduce the first sentence of Art. 20 TEC and a reference to an EU website 
(http://ec.europa.eu/consularprotection) in passports issued by its Member States 
after 1 July 2009. For passports issued before this date, Member States were 
recommended to make a sticker available containing the same information, 
Finally, Member States were invited to inform the Commission 18 months from 
the publication of this Recommendation in the Official Journal of the European 
Union of action taken in response to this Recommendation (counting from 6 May 
2008, the target date would mean no later than early November 2009). Interesting 
to note is that the website indicated in the Official Journal (referenced above) 
does not work (“HTTP 404 Not Found”);
58 
                                                                                                                                                 
53 Council Document 16097/06. 
54 Council Document 16231/06. 
55 European Commission (2007d). 
56 Council Document 10715/07. Porzio (2008), p. 95. 
57 Lindström (2009/forthcoming), p. 13. European Commission (2007b). 
58 European Commission (2008e), recommendations 1, 2 and 3. The URL given in the Official Journal, 
http://ec.europa.eu/consularprotection, was last accessed by the author on 16 April 2009 at 12:00 noon. •  On 1 December 2008, the COCON working group established that following 
exercises and on the basis of practical experience in terms of the Lead State 
concept, Member States “will consider the option of formalising this framework 
through a legal decision”;
59 
•  18￿20 February 2009, the Czech Presidency of the EU organised a “Seminar on 
Public Awareness Raising in the Event of Major Disasters”, the purpose of which 
was to compile a list of issues for inclusion in Council conclusions with the aim 
of creating recommendations to the Commission and the Member States for future 
action. Three working groups were organised, the second of which was asked to 
look at public information and education aimed at the EU population. Its 
recommendations included a focus on the prevention phase of a crisis (112 phone 
number), two-way communication, differentiated approaches depending on the 
target group (children, the elderly), and improving the role of embassies and 
consulates in providing information to citizens in cases of emergency.
60 
 
It is clear from this list of recent initiatives how important consular issues have become 
for the EU and its Member States. Yet, Member States are still primarily, “perhaps one 
should say exclusively”,
61 responsible for assisting their citizens. We will look more at 
this and its possible implications on public perception in the concluding chapter of our 
analysis, 3.2 A Critical View: What Do We Know?. 
 
 
2.3 EU Public Diplomacy: A Summary 
 
As already established by several observers, the potential of European Union public 
diplomacy efforts is enormous; the Union, with 27 Member States, almost half a billion 
citizens, and a global GDP of some 30 percent, should – by its mere size alone – be 
visible. In three capitals in the world (Washington, Beijing, Moscow), all 27 and the 
European Commission have a foreign mission each, whereas the EC on its own has 136 
                                                 
59 Council Document 16618/08, paragraphs 3 (of the Introduction) and 6.1. 
60 Council Document 7085/09. 
61 Porzio (2008), p. 95. Delegations across the globe, second only to the United States.
62 On an aggregate EU 
level, Europe has ten times as many representations as the U.S.
63 The sum of activities 
conducted by the 27 Member States make the collective EU easily the most active and 
well-funded public diplomacy actor in the world. In terms of spending, France alone 
reportedly uses the equivalent of more than USD 1 billion annually, or USD 17 per 
capita, on combined public diplomacy activities, which can be compared to the United 
States which spends a mere USD 0.65 per capita.
64 
 
It should also be pointed out, however, that public diplomacy activities (targeting external 
audiences) tend to be competitive rather than cooperative; regardless of what Member 
States decide to call it, public diplomacy is an acknowledged strategic tool for many 
European governments. Not only are they inevitably reluctant to surrender or share this 
with other governments, but it is usually conducted to further the national interest rather 
than used in a pan-European effort.
65 
 
While some claim that “the influence of the EU in the world and its ability to be heard are 
inversely proportional to the number of people and bodies claiming to represent and 
speak for it”
66, others point out that though the EU does not speak with one voice this 
does not necessarily mean that there is not, “on an abstract level, a common self-image 
and common messages transmitted by the cacophony of EU voices.” It can also be 
claimed that diversity is the EU brand, which is lived out on a daily basis, through the 
actual functioning of the EU.
67 
 
On a European level, both the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union 
and the European Commission conduct public diplomacy activities targeting primarily 
external audiences – though public diplomacy is in most cases not the employed term. 
Instead, these are referred to as “information activities” which include passive (websites, 
                                                 
62 European Commission (2009). 
63 Porzio (2008), p. 97. According to Porzio, the United States has approximately 400 missions around the 
world. 
64 Numbers from 2005. Fiske de Gouveia and Plumridge (2005), p. 11. 
65Ibid. 
66 Missiroli (2005), p. 8. 
67 Bay Rasmussen (2008), p. 6. publications, for example) and active measures (speaking tours, exhibits, etc.). In the 
Council, Directorate-General F (Communication, Information Policy and Protocol) takes 
the lead, whereas the High Representative for the CFSP plays an active role, in addition 
to having his own spokesperson. Within CFSP activities, also the EU Special 
Representatives (EUSRs) play a public diplomacy role as the focal point for local 
media.
68 
 
The European Commission, however, is the main actor in terms of public diplomacy; in 
addition to its operations at headquarters in Brussels, the Directorate-General for External 
Relations oversees PD efforts conducted by the 136 Delegations outside the Union. In 
addition to DG Relex, also other Directorates-General of the so-called Relex family have 
their own information and communications unit.
69 Of DG Relex’ information and 
communications budget of approximately EUR 8M, around 70 percent is destined to the 
work of the Delegations. This amount can be compared to the budget allotted to domestic 
communication within the EU, which is approximately ten times as much.
70 On a 
practical level, cooperation is already taking place between the General Secretariat of the 
Council and the Commission’s DG Relex on informing (internal and external audiences) 
about CFSP and ESDP issues, whereas within the European Commission the so-called 
Relex Information Committee (‘RIC’) regularly meets at an operational level to, inter 
alia, exchange information and identify issues where joint projects could be carried out.
71 
 
In the field European foreign policy, at least three major, recent changes with a likely 
impact on the EU’s related PD efforts have been identified: (i) The adoption of the 
European Security Strategy (ESS) in December 2003, which was a serious attempt to 
‘define the problem’; (ii) the ESDP has widened both functionally and geographically 
                                                 
68 Lynch (2005), p. 26. 
69Ibid, p. 27. The so-called Relex family DGs generally include DGs External Relations, Trade, 
Development and Relations with African, Caribbean and Pacific States, EuropeAid, Echo (the European 
Commission’s Humanitarian Aid Office), Enlargement and, occasionally, Economic and Financial Affairs 
(for external issues). 
70 Bay Rasmussen, p. 10. 
71 There is also a certain level of coordination between all EU institutions through the Inter-Institutional 
Group for Information (IGI), which meets regularly at the level of Vice-President to coordinate information 
issues. European Commission (2006b), pp. 10￿11 (in the English version). (broader missions, geographically stretching from the near region to Africa and Asia); 
(iii) the ESDP has ‘hardened’ (shift from first to second Headline Goal, the establishment 
of battle groups). Not necessarily internally consistent, it has been suggested that these 
changes will make the EU’s message (even) fuzzier.
72 
 
In light of this complex institutional set-up, with multiple actors and possibly inconsistent 
messages, the European Commission early 2006 adopted “The EU in the World. Towards 
a Communication Strategy for the European Union’s External Policy, 2006￿2009. The 
link between internal and external audiences is established already in the first two 
paragraphs of the Communication; though focusing on improving the Commission’s 
information policy in respect of non-member states, the Communication states that “there 
is a need to maintain a more sustained, open dialogue with the public within the EU on 
the Union’s external policy”, and “[b]etter informing the EU’s citizens of the external 
dimension of the Union’s activities and their relevance to the stability, security and 
prosperity of the Union also plays its part […].” It reminds the reader that ‘the EU in the 
world’ is one of three priorities of the Barroso Commission and as a means to reduce 
public confusion over different messages emanating from different policy actors, the 
European Commission must seek stronger coherence of its messages.
73 
 
This focus on European citizens must be seen against the backdrop of recent EU internal 
developments: Following the Danish “no” to the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, the Irish 
rejection of the Treaty of Nice in a referendum in 2001, and the turned down 
Constitutional Treaty by France and the Netherlands in 2005, there was a perceived need 
to better explain to Europe’s citizens what the European Union and (further) European 
integration were about. Applied to initiatives and policies within the European Union, the 
Commission’s new approach was outlined in its ‘Plan D’ (where D stood for Democracy, 
Dialogue and Debate) in October 2005. Plan D was said to put citizens at the heart of 
European policies, and was based on three principles: listening to citizens, taking their 
                                                 
72 Lynch, pp. 6￿7. 
73 Interesting to note is that the draft strategy identifies five priority areas where this is particularly needed: 
Global solidarity, enlargement, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), Africa, and strategic bilateral 
relationships (i.e. consular cooperation does not feature in this list – or in the document). European 
Commission (2006c), pp. 1￿2 (in the English version). views and concerns into account; communicating how the EU policies affect their 
everyday lives; and connecting with citizens by “going local”, i.e. addressing people in 
their national or local settings and using their favourite form of media.
74 
 
More recently, the Commission in its Communicating Europe in Partnership presented 
on 3 October 2007, proposed an Inter-institutional agreement on communication, the aim 
of which was to achieve a convergence of views on the main communication priorities of 
the European Union as a whole; to identify the added value of an EU approach to 
communication on specific priority issues; to develop synergies concerning the resources 
used by each institution; to carry out activities related to these priorities; and to encourage 
Member States to cooperate. This was immediately followed in the text by a clear 
limitation: “This does not prevent each EU institution from having separate, institution-
specific communication activities geared to its specific role and to its stakeholders”.
75 
Following up to the Commission’s proposal, the External Relations Council meeting on 
29 April 2008 in its conclusions requested the European Commission to pay due regard to 
the Union’s policies as a whole and to the role played by institutions and bodies within 
them.
76 
 
It is clear that the EU’s public diplomacy potential is enormous, but that many actors are 
involved, which makes drafting and agreeing on consistent messages more challenging. 
Perhaps the area of EU consular crisis management cooperation could prove less 
challenging and more straightforward, with clearly identifiable messages and direct 
benefits for both EU citizens and audiences outside the Union?
                                                 
74 European Commission (2005). European Commission (2008). 
75 European Commission (2007), p. 15. 
76 Council of the European Union (2008). PART III. ANALYSIS 
 
3.1 Analysis of Legal Provisions, Budgetary Resources and Actions Undertaken 
 
As stated in 1.4 Definitions, Limitations and Potential Bias, the focus of this study will be 
on the European Commission and the General Secretariat of the Council of the European 
Union; the European Parliament is not included in the following analysis. 
 
3.1.1 Legal Provisions 
 
Any budget commitment undertaken by the European Commission must have a legal 
basis; without a legal basis the action cannot be initiated. As a general rule, the legal basis 
is a law based on an article in the Treaty giving competence, or right, to the Community 
for a specific policy area and setting out the conditions for fulfilling that competence 
(including budget implementation). Certain Treaty articles authorise the Commission to 
undertake certain actions, which imply spending, without there being a further legal act.
77 
One example – of direct relevance to this study – is information and communications 
activities, which are based on the Commission’s so-called institutional prerogatives.
78 For 
reasons of clarity, however, in the following part individual references to the legal basis 
used will be made for each quoted budget line. 
 
 
3.1.2 Budgetary Resources 
 
In the following part, three caveats have to be pointed out: 
 
                                                 
77 European Commission (2009d). 
78 Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) (2006). The text of Article 49 states that: “[T]he following may be 
implemented without a basic act provided the actions which they are intended to finance fall within the 
powers of the Communities or the European Union: […] (d) appropriations for one-off actions, or even 
actions for an indefinite duration, carried out by the Commission by virtue of tasks resulting from its 
prerogatives at institutional level pursuant to the EC Treaty […].” 1. Please note that amounts referred to below refer to budgetary resources available in the 
form of commitment appropriations for 2009; since payment appropriations generally are 
allocated to cover outstanding commitments for one or several budget years (previous 
commitments), to include also these would not accurately reflect existing resources; 
 
2. Please note that amounts quoted are budget items that potentially could be used for 
public diplomacy activities in the field of EU consular crisis management; this does not 
mean that these resources (fully) are currently being used to this effect; 
 
3. In terms of budgetary resources of the European Commission referred to below, it 
could be argued that (a portion of) the budgets of both DG Communications, the Office 
for Official Publications of the European Communities (OPOCE) and the Joint Research 
Centre (whose Institute for Protection and Security of Citizens provides scientific and 
technological support to EU policies, including crisis management)
79 should be included 
in this part of the study. In order not to overestimate existing available resources that 
could be used for public diplomacy activities pertaining to EU consular crisis 
management (both internally and externally), however, we have made a deliberate 
decision to calculate existing resources in as conservative and modest an approach as 
possible and hence excluded these. 
 
European Commission 
 
In the EU budget, there is no reference to “public diplomacy”; public diplomacy activities 
are in general instead referred to as “information activities”.
80 Of relevance to this study 
are European Commission (Section III) budget lines under Title 18 – “Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice” –, Title 19 – “External Relations” – and, and to a lesser extent, Title 
07 – “Environment” – under which civil protection falls. 
 
                                                 
79 European Commission (2009e). 
80 Or “information and communications activities”. See inter alia Lynch (2005), p. 26. Starting with Title 18 (“Area of Freedom, Security and Justice”), Chapter 08 (“Policy 
Strategy and Coordination”), three budget lines are of interest to this study: 18.0406, 
“Fundamental rights and citizenship”, 18.0801, “PRINCE – Area of freedom, security 
and justice”, and 18.0805, “Evaluation impact assessment”. 
 
The budget line pertaining to “Fundamental rights and citizenship” is intended to, inter 
alia, support promoting the development of a European society based on respect for 
fundamental rights as recognised in Article 6(2) of the Treaty on European Union, 
including rights derived from citizenship of the Union; strengthening civil society and to 
encourage an open, transparent and regular dialogue with it in respect of fundamental 
rights. In particular, this appropriation is said to cover (among other initiatives) the 
organisation of public campaigns and events; development and maintenance of websites; 
preparation and dissemination of information material. The legal basis for this budget line 
is Council Decision 2007/252/JHA of 19 April 2007, establishing for the period 2007 to 
2013 the specific programme ‘Fundamental rights and citizenship’ as part of the general 
programme ‘Fundamental Rights and Justice’ (OJ L 110, 27 April 2007, p. 33; 
corrigendum OJ L 141, 2 June 2007, p. 83). 
 
Budget line 18.0801 is said to cover the funding of priority information measures on 
Community policies in the field of justice and home affairs in relation to the 
establishment of an area of freedom, security and justice. Examples of information 
activities include internal web sites, public events, communication products, and 
Eurobarometer surveys. According to the accompanying remarks, measures are designed 
to be an effective channel of communication and dialogue between people of the 
European Union and the Community institutions and take account of specific national 
and regional characteristics, in close cooperation with Member State authorities. The 
provision is also said to cover the funding of an awareness-raising campaign by the 
Commission, in cooperation with civil society, on EU citizens’ rights. 
 
Budget line 18.0805 is intended to cover a list of five items, one of which is “to prepare 
for the implementation of pilot projects and preparatory actions”. The legal basis for both budget line 18.0801 and 18.0805 is Article 49(6) of the Financial Regulation, institutional 
prerogatives of the European Commission.
81 
 
“Fundamental rights and citizenship” receives EUR 14.2M in commitment 
appropriations for 2009 (up from EUR 12M in 2008, an increase of approximately 18 
percent), “PRINCE – Area of freedom, security and justice” EUR 5M (down from EUR 
7.814M in 2008, a decrease of approximately 36 percent), while “Evaluation impact 
assessment” obtains EUR 900,000 (down from EUR 1M the previous year, a decrease of 
10 percent). No explanation for either change is indicated.
82 
 
Turning to Title 19 (“External Relations”), two budget lines – 19.1102 and 19.1103 – are 
of interest to us: According to the remarks for budget line 19.1102, entitled “Information 
programmes for non-member countries”, the information activities to be carried out under 
this budget line fall into two broad categories: horizontal activities and logistical support 
from headquarters, and activities carried out by Commission Delegations in non-member 
countries and vis-à-vis international organisations. Activities include the production and 
distribution of publications on priority themes as part of an annual programme; the 
production and dissemination of audiovisual material; the development of information 
delivered via electronic media (the internet and electronic message systems); support for 
the information activities of opinion leaders that are consistent with the European 
Union’s priorities. In terms of decentralised measures carried out by Delegations in non-
member countries and vis-à-vis international organisations, the Delegations have to 
propose an annual communication plan in line with the communication goals laid down 
for each region and each country which, once approved by headquarters, is assigned a 
budgetary allocation. These measures fall into six categories: (1) newsletters, (2), 
websites, (3) relations with the media, (4) information products (other publications, 
graphic material, etc.), (5) organisation of events, (6) other activities (this includes, since 
2007, the management of the network of information points). The legal basis for this 
                                                 
81 European Parliament (2009). 
82 Ibid. budget line is, in line with what is described above, Article 49(6), i.e. tasks resulting from 
the Commission’s prerogatives at institutional level.
83 
 
The total budget appropriations for commitments (i.e. new initiatives) for 2009 for this 
budget line (19.1102) is EUR 14.35M, which can be compared to EUR 10.7M the 
previous year. This represents an increase of approximately 34 percent, which can likely 
be explained by the initiative to fund news broadcasts in Farsi to Iran, as instigated by the 
European Parliament.  
 
Budget line 19.1103, “The European Union in the World”, is intended to cover the 
funding of priority information and communication activities directed toward the citizens 
of the EU and dealing with the EU’s external policies as a whole. Areas covered include 
efforts to address a weak public perception of external assistance, initiatives pertaining to 
the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), information activities – to be carried out in 
cooperation with the Council – on the aims and development of the common foreign and 
security policy (CFSP), the organisation of visits for groups or representatives of civil 
society, all with a particular focus on the future of the EU’s external policy. The legal 
basis is, as for the budget line mentioned above, Article 49(6); in addition, a reference is 
made to Regulation (EC) No 2049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission 
documents (OJ L 145, 31.5.2001, p. 43).
84 
 
This budget line (19.1103) receives a total of EUR 5M in commitment appropriations for 
2009, to be compared to EUR 3M in 2008. The increase by 40 percent is not given an 
explanation in the General Budget for Title 19, but a possible reason is intensified 
information and communications efforts in the lead-up to the possible coming-into-force 
of the Lisbon Reform Treaty and the establishment of a European External Action 
Service (EEAS). 
 
                                                 
83 European Parliament (2009). 
84 Ibid. As we have seen in the chapter on EU consular crisis management cooperation above, the 
area of environment also plays a role in terms of consular crisis management in the sense 
that the European Commission’s Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) – as a tool of 
the Community Mechanism for civil protection – is managed by DG Environment.
85 
Though featured in a very limited manner, consular assistance is mentioned in Title 07 
(“Environment”) of the General Budget: Budget line 07.0401, “Civil Protection Financial 
Instrument”, is said to cover “in particular” a list comprising 14 items, out of which one 
is “the support to consular assistance to EU citizens in major emergencies in third 
countries regarding civil protection activities, upon request from the consular authorities 
of the Member States”. Though this provision does not mention public diplomacy or 
information activities specifically, the wording seems to suggest that this would be 
allowed, at least on the condition that Member States request it. Unlike for the two DG 
Relex budget lines, the legal basis here is not an institutional prerogative, but Council 
Decision 2007/162/EC, Euratom of 5 March 2007 establishing a Civil Protection 
Financial Instrument (OJ L 71, 10.3.2007), and Council Decision 2007/779/EC, Euratom 
of 8 November 2007 establishing a Community Civil Protection Mechanism (recast) (OJ 
L 314, 1.12.2007).
86 
 
The 2009 commitment budget appropriations for budget line 07.0401 amount to EUR 
18.5M, which can be compared to a total of EUR 20M the previous year. No explanation 
as to the reasons for this slight decrease (-7.5 percent) is given. 
 
General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union 
 
Turning to the budget of the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union 
(the Council Secretariat), it is evident that its financial resources are much more 
restricted: In the EU’s general budget, Section II (Council) Title 3 refers to “Expenditure 
arising out of the institution’s performance of its specific missions”. Chapter 33 
(“Operating Expenditure”) contains two sub-headings, 3311 for “General publications” 
                                                 
85 See inter alia European Commission (2007e). 
86 European Parliament (2009). and 3312 for “Information and public events”. According to the accompanying remarks, 
the former is intended to cover the costs of preparing, publishing by traditional means 
(paper or microfilm) or electronic methods and disseminating Council ESDP/CFSP 
publications other than in the Official Journal, whereas the appropriations for the latter 
are for expenditure on information under the EDSP/CFSP. Neither mentions a legal basis, 
but both include a reference to “Amount of assigned revenue in accordance with Article 
18(1) of the Financial Regulation: p.m.”
87 
 
Budget line 3311 (“General publications”) receives EUR 90,000 in commitment 
appropriations for 2009 (unchanged from the previous year), while item 3312 
(“Information and public events”) obtains EUR 55,000 (which can be compared to EUR 
50,000 in the previous year, i.e. an increase of 10 percent, though from a very low 
level).
88 
 
According to Giorgio Porzio, Head of Unit in the EU Joint European Situation 
Centre/General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union at the Cabinet of 
SG/HR Javier Solana in Brussels, the Secretariat has no specific budget for consular 
activities, but expenditure is made on a case-by-case basis, drawing from the resources 
available in other departments, including the press/information budget.
89 
 
To summarise, it is clear from a budgetary standpoint that the General Secretariat of the 
European Union at most has a symbolic (potential) public diplomacy role: Even 
considering its total information and communications budget of EUR 145,000 (EUR 
90,000 and 45,000 for “General publications” and “Information and public events”, 
respectively), this is extremely limited compared to a very conservative estimate of what 
could be available to the European Commission in the area of public diplomacy activities 
related to EU consular crisis management; the total of the numbers above amounts to 
                                                 
87 European Parliament (2009). 
88Ibid. 
89 Porzio (2009). EUR 57.95M.
90 Though it can be argued, for example, that the Civil Protection Financial 
Instrument is intended to cover a majority of items which is not public diplomacy-related 
activities, we have already pointed out that the budgets of DG Communications, the 
Office of Office for Official Publications of the European Communities (OPOCE) and 
the Joint Research Centre (JRC) – which could arguably also partially be employed for 
such purposes – are not included in the mathematical exercise. Hence, though the total 
potential budget of both institutions in this area (EUR 58,095,000) should not be taken as 
an exact number, it can be seen as an approximate total budget that could be used to this 
end should the institutions so choose (and the Member States and the European 
Parliament let them). 
 
3.1.3 Action Undertaken 
 
Caveat: Please note that all action referred to below pertains not to EU consular crisis 
management per se, but to public diplomacy activities related to the field of EU consular 
crisis management. 
 
According to Giorgio Porzio, Head of the Classified Communications Networks and 
Consular Affairs Unit of the EU Joint European Situation Centre/General Secretariat of 
the Council of the European Union at the Cabinet of SG/HR Javier Solana in Brussels, 
consular guidelines exist that already suggest that the responsibilities for “information 
management” for consular crisis matters lie with the Council Secretariat.
91 This does not 
seem to be entirely reflected by action undertaken, however (please see initiatives three 
and four below). 
 
Thus far, five – soon six – initiatives exist in this field: 
 
                                                 
90 The European Parliament has, for reasons outlined above, intentionally been excluded from this study. 
Interesting to note regarding the European Parliament, however, is that the European Union Visitors 
Programme, which is a clear EU public diplomacy tool, is jointly managed by the European Parliament and 
the European Commission, though it was initiated in 1974 by the European Parliament. Scott-Smith (2005). 
91 Centre for European Policy Studies (2007). 1. A brochure on “European Consular Assistance” was issued on 10 March 2006, and 
exists in 21 of the 23 official EU languages (Bulgarian and Romanian missing). The 
brochure is a two-page .pdf file which folded turns into a ten-page document informing 
citizens that they are (also) citizens of the European Union and, as such, can ask another 
Member State’s Embassy or Consulate for help. The brochure mentions the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, as reconfirmed in the Constitution for Europe (which was 
eventually turned down in popular referenda in France and the Netherlands – this is not 
mentioned, however), and lists a number of situations which can happen during travel: “If 
your passport has been lost or stolen… If you need help… If you want to be repatriated… 
If a serious accident or health problem has disrupted your trip… If you have been 
arrested by the police or detained… If you have been the victim of violence…”. The 
leaflet continues by stating that “If you find yourself in one of these difficult situations in 
a country outside the European Union, and if your country does not have any diplomatic 
or consular representation there, you can always ask for help and consular assistance 
from another European Union Member State, under the same conditions as the help it 
provides for its own citizens”, which is followed by a reminder of what conditions must 
be fulfilled to be eligible for this. The brochure rhetorically asks “Did you know?”, and 
enthusiastically reminds the reader that s/he is “[…] a citizen of the European Union!” (in 
all 21 languages). It also contains a link to the second existing initiative in this field, 
namely a travel website (more on this below).
92 
 
The “European Consular Assistance” brochure was produced by the General Secretariat 
of the European Council. In addition to existing online as a .pdf available for download in 
21 official EU languages, the leaflet was printed in 600,000 copies at a cost of roughly 
EUR 50,000, paid by Directorate-General F (Press, Communication, Protocol) of the 
General Secretariat at the request of the EU Joint European Situation Centre; Member 
States only had to pay for collecting them, which cost approximately EUR 0.01/copy.
93 
 
                                                 
92 General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union (2006). 
93 Porzio (2009). 2. The second existing initiative is a travel website, referred to in the brochure mentioned 
above. The website – www.travel-voyage.consilium.europa.eu – to date only exists in 
English and French, and at the top of the page contains the disclaimer “Under 
construction.”
94 The homepage of the website is only one screen, with three sub-menus: 
One containing a drop-down menu leading to “(Available) Travel advice” issued by all 
27 EU Member States and Australia and the United States; another containing an 
additional drop-down menu leading to the “European Consular Assistance” brochure as a 
.pdf, available in 21 official EU languages; and the third sub-menu including two drop-
down menus which together function as a grid, one of which is called 
“Presence/Representation” containing all 27 EU Member States, and the other titled “of 
EU Member States” containing a total of 238 states and/or geographical entities, also 
comprising the 27 EU Member States.
95 
 
The travel website, as well as a protected website (the COCON Travel Risk Assessment 
website, accessible only to EU Member States’ Ministries of Foreign Affairs and the 
European Commission) is financed via the Council Secretariat’s DG A5 budget, i.e. the 
IT Department. It is currently in the process of being “comprehensively overhauled” with 
the help of the Joint Research Centre (part of the European Commission) in Ispra, Italy, 
at a cost of around EUR 100,000. The Council will export some of the data to the 
European Commission (DG JLS) so that the Commission can make some information 
also available to the public at large.
96 
 
According to Porzio, the Secretariat of the Council is “in the business of assisting 
Member States, whereas Member States and the Commission have a wider role [of] being 
in contact with the public.”
97 Compared to the earlier statement by Porzio (referenced 
above), according to which responsibilities for information management in terms of 
consular crisis matters lie with the Council Secretariat, the more recent one seems to be a 
                                                 
94 Council of the European Union, General Secretariat (2009) (situation as of 11 April 2009, 01:00pm). 
95 Ibid. 
96 Porzio (2009). 
97 Ibid. contradiction. An alternative interpretation would be that a change, albeit slow and 
limited, has taken place from late 2007 until now (March 2009). 
 
3. A third project is a poster informing EU citizens about their rights according to Art. 20 
TEC. The poster, titled “Consular protection at European level”, shows a buoy with the 
EU stars in two instances, at the bottom of which it states “Bringing Europe closer to the 
people”. Below the picture of the buoy is a list of six questions: “Passport lost or stolen? 
Have you been a victim of violent crime? Have you had a serious accident? Have you 
been arrested or detained? Do you need to be repatriated? Do you need help urgently?”. 
To the right of this list of questions, the poster reminds EU citizens that they are entitled 
to protection and that they can “expect the embassies and consulates of any other EU 
country to assist you on the same conditions as nationals of that State”, on three 
conditions (which are also listed on the poster). In the lower-left corner of the poster is 
the EU flag, the text “European Commission Directorate-General Justice, Freedom and 
Security” and a reference and link to DG JLS’ website.
98 
 
The poster, which was produced, printed in 14,500 copies, and fully financed by the 
European Commission’s DG Justice, Liberty and Security, was initially distributed in 
April 2007 to the national associations of travel agents in the Member States in all 27 EU 
Member States.
99 Though the General Secretariat of the Council had offered to provide 
the artwork and the text for the poster (if nothing else but to “make it more palatable for 
Member States”, according to Porzio), this was turned down by the Commission. The end 
products is said to have been “thoroughly disliked” by the Member States.
100 
 
4. A fourth initiative, very punctual and limited in time, is a brochure called “Useful 
information for EU citizens travelling to China during the Games of the XXIX Olympiad. 
                                                 
98 European Commission (2008c). Interestingly enough, the poster is not available on Europa, the official 
website of the EU institutions, but can be found/downloaded through the former website of an Irish 
network (“Ireland’s Emigrant Advice Network”) at http://www.ean.ie/wp-
content/uploads/2008/12/poster_final_en.pdf [last accessed 11 April 2009]. 
99 European Commission (2009c). The reference to the distribution of the posters can be found in European 
Commission (2007g). 
100 Porzio (2009). Beijing 2008.”
101 The brochure was produced and financed by DG Justice, Liberty and 
Security in 2008.
102 
 
5. Though still not definitive or overall implemented, a fifth initiative deserves to be 
mentioned in this context: Originally part of the Barnier report’s recommendations,
103 the 
idea to include the first paragraph of Art. 20 TEC in passports issued by individual EU 
Member States to inform EU citizens about this right made its way into the European 
Commission’s Action Plan 2007￿2009, presented on 5 December 2007. Under the 
heading “Areas identified for action 2007￿2009”, the Commission recommends Member 
States to print Art. 20 TEC in passports issued after 1 July 2009. The Commission points 
out in the Action Plan that this proposal, which was also included in its Green Paper 
(presented on 28 November 2006), encountered almost unanimous support during the 
public consultation of said Green Paper. On 6 May 2008, the European Commission’s 
formal Recommendation to do so was published in the Official Journal of the European 
Union.
104 
 
The decision on whether or not to include Art. 20 TEC in new passports is up to the each 
Member State. An alternative text, which would be more explanatory than legal, could 
also be a possibility. Though no definitive text has yet been agreed (situation as of 26 
March 2009), the cost for printing a reference to this right, and/or a sticker which could 
be affixed to passports already issued, would be borne by the individual Member State.
105 
According to DG Justice, Liberty and Security, a few Member States are currently 
underway to start printing the first sentence in new passports and others will follow 
(situation of 15 April 2009).
106 
 
6. Finally, a sixth project currently still in the making stems from the European 
Commission’s Action Plan 2007￿2009, namely to establish an EU website on 
                                                 
101 European Commission (2008f). 
102 European Commission (2009c). 
103 Barnier (2006), p. 21. 
104 European Commission (2008e). 
105 Porzio (2009). 
106 European Commission (2009d). information on consular assistance (in general, i.e. not specifically geared to consular 
crisis situations) to EU citizens. It shall, by the end of 2009, give user-friendly 
explanations of related Community law as well as practical information. (Also mentioned 
in the Action Plan is a common phone number on consular protection; according to the 
same source within the European Commission, this project is still the object of 
exploratory talks with other Commission Directorates-General).
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3.2 A Critical View: What Do We Know? 
 
Already at the outset, we made it clear that an impact assessment of public diplomacy is 
outside the scope of this study. But it would be unreasonable, however, to not critically 
ask whether, for every euro (€) spent on public diplomacy efforts related to EU consular 
crisis management cooperation, there would be an impact on the perception of ‘the EU’ 
(however defined or understood), with both target groups, i.e. the internal or EU-
audience, and in terms of audiences outside the Union. 
 
Though blunt and far from sophisticated as a means to measure the impact, it has to be 
assumed that a situation where – ceteris paribus – the public perception of the EU is 
greater than zero (‘0’) after public diplomacy activities have taken place, as compared to 
before, the EU has managed to ‘move the needle’. Until more research has taken place, 
and better tailored methods of assessment exist, this would be our suggested measure of 
success. 
 
With this assumption as our starting point, we will now turn to what we do know about 
this field. In brief, could the EU (again, however defined or understood) be more ‘loved’ 
if its citizens, as well as audiences outside of the Union, see it as doing something good 
(or more than previously) in terms of consular crisis management cooperation? 
 
                                                 
107 Ibid. Though humanitarian assistance is different from consular emergency assistance, the 
practical difference in terms of perception in the ‘foreign country’ (i.e. the country 
affected by a crisis, natural or man-made) can be assumed to be minimal among the 
audience in the affected country. From surveys, we know that the public attitude vis-à-vis 
the provider of the assistance tends to be affected in a positive manner.
108 We also know 
that favourable attitudes that result from disaster relief tend to have an expiration date, 
i.e. its positive effects wither away over time.
109 Here again, we believe that consular 
emergency assistance can be extrapolated from disaster relief in terms of perceptions in 
the affected country. It should, however, be pointed out that there are several other 
factors that influence public attitudes, including research in the field of sociology and 
psychology, which cautions us not to assume that a gift of any form will be reciprocated 
with gratitude.
110 
 
But what would an effective public diplomacy in terms of EU consular crisis 
management cooperation have to include? Even if, first of all, the EU would add value in 
terms of a given consular crisis management cooperation effort and, secondly, the Union 
(through the European Commission, the General Secretariat of the European Union, 
Member States and/or a combination of these) would undertake public diplomacy 
activities to accompany the effort, what is required for the above to ‘move the needle’? 
 
A first condition is that the assistance is perceived to be adequate and the relief effort 
judged to be successfully handled. A second condition is that the EU takes credit for it, 
i.e. even in the event of a joint/multilateral effort the European level must be seen as 
adding value. 
 
                                                 
108 According to the Pew Global Attitudes Project, the percentage of Indians that said they held favourable 
views of the United States increased from 15 percent in 2003 to 38 percent in 2005, following U.S. aid to 
victims of the 2004 tsunami. Though it can be questioned whether the U.S. post-tsunami assistance (alone) 
caused this shift, a poll by “A Terror Free Tomorrow” seems to support this interpretation; according to the 
latter, 63 percent of Indonesians surveyed reported having a more favourable opinion of the U.S. because of 
this assistance. Similar numbers exist for Pakistan. The Brookings Institution (2008), p. 6￿7. 
109Ibid, p. 7. 
110 Ibid, p. 8￿10. Even if the first condition can be assumed to be true, i.e. that EU consular crisis 
management cooperation is running smoothly and lives are saved, the second prerequisite 
seems more problematic. Returning to our initial discourse on the alleged lack of support 
for an Ever Closer Union, one of the identified key reasons for this is the so-called 
Brussels’ blame game, i.e. the phenomenon that national politicians or governments like 
to claim credit for EU decisions that prove popular and to blame ‘Brussels’, or ‘the EU’, 
for the unpopular ones.
111 This is linked to the question of whether the perception of what 
is done is by definition competitive. In other words, when ‘the EU’ is seen as the actor 
(for good or bad), does the perception of the EU’s actions take something away from the 
individual Member States? Though outside the scope of this study, the literature on 
European identity has traditionally been based on the assumption that national and 
European identification are competitors in a zero-sum game; more recently, however, it 
has been suggested that the two are positively correlated.
112 
 
According to a Eurobarometer survey on consular protection carried out in 2006, it was 
established that on average half of the people living in the EU planned to travel outside 
the Union within the coming three years. It also became clear that only a minority (23 
percent) of the people were aware that if they need urgent help in a country where their 
own country has no Embassy or Consulate, they have the right to use the consular 
assistance of any other European Union Member State. Though the plurality (39 percent) 
but not the majority of residents would prefer to receive help from their own country if in 
trouble in a country without Embassy or Consulate of their own nationality, 21 percent 
(of the then EU25 population surveyed) would favour help from a designated central EU 
service located in the country, and 20 percent would prefer help from the Embassy or 
Consulate of any (other) EU country.
113 On the basis of these findings, the European 
Commission in its Green Paper claimed that citizens want the European profile to be 
raised.
114 
 
                                                 
111 European Commission (2007f). 
112 See e.g. Bruter (2003), p. 1159. 
113 The Gallup Organization (2006). 
114 European Commission (2006b). A more recent public opinion survey conducted in Sweden by the market research 
institute Synovate asked a number of questions to Swedes about EU membership and 
which issues they believe the EU should deal with. One of the questions pertained to EU 
responsibility for coordinating assistance to Member States that have been affected by 
disasters and to EU citizens involved in disasters elsewhere in the world. The answers 
were very clear: Seven out of ten people consider that the EU should take considerable 
responsibility in the event of a disaster. At the same time, fewer than two out of ten think 
that the EU is doing this today.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS 
 
As stated initially, this study has three purposes: 
 
1. First, to briefly outline the development and current state of European Union (EU) 
consular crisis management cooperation as articulated in Art. 20 TEC; 
 
2. Second, to attempt to summarise EU public diplomacy efforts in general – with a focus 
on the external dimension (though the border between the internal and external 
dimensions tend to be blurred); 
 
3. Third – against the findings in descriptive parts one and two ￿, to look at consular 
crisis management cooperation as a means of EU public diplomacy: What would it mean 
and what are its limits? To make this assessment, we analysed four factors in terms of 
public diplomacy activities as applied to EU consular crisis management cooperation: (i) 
What do legal provisions say? (ii) How much resources are committed, in terms of 
budgets available? (iii) What is currently being done? and (iv) What do public opinion 
polls suggest? 
 
                                                 
115 Swedish Government Offices (2009). According to the speech, the survey was conducted in December 
2008. Having tried to get access to the raw data from Synovate, the author was unsuccessful in this 
endeavour, which is why secondary data must be used. In 1.4 Definitions, Limitations and Potential Bias we also stated that our working 
definition of public diplomacy would be “Getting other people on one’s side.”, where 
‘one’ is ‘the EU’ (however defined or understood), given that ‘the perception of the EU’ 
would be the dependent variable in any effort to ‘move the needle’. 
 
In terms of the development and current state of EU consular crisis management 
cooperation, first of all, we have seen that though this dimension was opened up to EU 
action through the Treaty of Maastricht, it would take two years before Member States 
agreed on a one-page document (Decision 95/553/EC). This Decision was only ratified 
following exogenous events (the 9/11 attacks in the United States), six and a half years 
later. Today, there is an institutional structure in place on the EU level, and guidelines 
which are not legally binding, but which have acquired a “special status”, exist. A 
number of initiatives – some more far-reaching than others – have been presented in the 
last three years, though the most ambitious of these have not (yet) been agreed to. 
Member States still remain reluctant to let these issues be managed by the EU level. Key 
here seems to be the issue of responsibility. 
 
Second, in terms of EU public diplomacy efforts more broadly, it has been established 
that the EU’s PD potential is enormous. With a network ten times that of the United 
States, the EU’s Member States’ and the European Commissions’ missions outside the 
Union could have a great impact. The European Union is not, however, a federation like 
the U.S. Hence, its PD efforts outside the Union tend to be more competitive than would 
otherwise be the case. Others argue that perhaps this is not necessarily a bad thing, and 
that it might accurately reflect what the EU is all about – diversity. Nevertheless, in terms 
of the EU institutional set-up and agreeing on coherent messages (within and outside the 
Union), the Council and the European Commission can very well, if they choose to, have 
“separate, institution-specific communication activities geared to its specific role and to 
its stakeholders”. 
 
Against the backdrop of several negative votes to referenda on revised EU Treaties, and 
originally a by-product of the Commission’s Plan D (targeting the EU’s citizens within the EU), The EU in the World was adopted early 2006 as a means to provide overall 
strategic guidance to the Commission’s so-called Relex family, comprising seven 
Directorates-General, in its PD activities. Though specifically aiming at audiences in 
third countries, the communications strategy also mentions the EU’s citizens, and hence 
continues to blur the line between internal and external, strengthening our argument for 
keeping an ‘intermestic’ approach to our study rather than adopting a strict division 
between the two. Though most of the resources available for PD efforts go to Delegations 
(for DG Relex), compared to internal communications’ efforts (external) PD resources 
are dwarfed, representing only a tenth of what is spent on information and 
communications within the Union. 
 
Third, looking at consular crisis management cooperation as a means of EU public 
diplomacy – what would it mean and what are its limits? –, a number of conclusions are 
suggested: 
 
We have established that enabling legal provisions exist, mainly in the form of the 
institutional prerogative, but also (and potentially less controversial with Member States) 
for one of the relevant budget lines (18.0406, “Fundamental rights and citizenship”), a 
Council Decision (2007/252/JHA of 19 April 2007, establishing for the period 2007 to 
2013 the specific programme ‘Fundamental rights and citizenship’ as part of the general 
programme ‘Fundamental Rights and Justice’). This gives the EU level, through the 
European Commission, considerable scope to act and step up its public diplomacy efforts 
in the area of consular crisis management cooperation – both targeting its own citizens 
and foreign audiences. 
 
Once a legal basis has been identified (and judged viable to use), the next step for 
Community or EU action is to find the budgetary resources: Also in this respect have we 
established that there is scope for action, i.e. means exist. Though scarce, a potential total 
amount available in the General Budget for the European Union for the financial year 
2009 (including the European Commission and the General Secretariat of the European 
Union) is EUR 58,095,000. As already has been pointed out, this amount should not be seen as an exact number or even fully available. Some of the budget lines we have used 
as the basis for our calculation are expected to cover also other items, yet on the other 
hand there are a number of budget lines of other Directorates-General that we have 
chosen to exclude. Hence, the figure can be regarded as a fairly adequate estimate of the 
means available. 
 
Despite the above, to date the total number of existing initiatives can be counted on one 
hand. In terms of budgetary impact, we lack information about the amount required to 
produce the posters, as well as the brochures for European citizens travelling to the 
Olympic Games in China, referred to above. Excluding these two, the total estimated 
amount spent on the above-mentioned initiatives from the EU’s General Budget is EUR 
150,000 (totalling EUR 50,000 for the production of the “European Consular Assistance” 
brochure, and EUR 100,000 financed over the Joint Research Centre’s budget – not 
included in our analysis – for the “comprehensive overhaul” of the Council’s travel 
website), or approximately 0.26 percent of the total, estimated budget. 
 
According to the Eurobarometer survey on consular protection carried out in 2006, 
approximately a fifth of respondents said they would favour help from a designated 
central EU service located in the country, while another fifth would prefer help from the 
Embassy or Consulate of any (other) EU country. A more recent study in Sweden 
suggested that seven out of ten people consider that the EU should take considerable 
responsibility in the event of a disaster – so the ‘legitimacy’ for (further) EU action 
within this field seems justifiable. 
 
Though consular crisis management cooperation is far from the whole picture of what the 
EU is doing, it is surprising that not more attention is given to the area – especially in 
light of its increasing importance with citizens in general. Adding the European 
Commission’s discourse about the importance of communicating with and listening to its 
citizens and audiences in third countries, the discrepancy between the scope and 
resources and actual action (both in terms of EU consular crisis management cooperation 
and linked public diplomacy activities) becomes even more striking.  
In terms of the limits of EU consular crisis management cooperation as a means of EU 
public diplomacy, a number of constraints seem to be at hand: 
 
•  Responsibility, first of all: Protecting one’s citizens belongs to the core 
responsibilities of any state, hence EU Member States’ governments seem 
reluctant to let consular crisis management be handled at the EU level. 
Furthermore, a blurring of responsibility is not in anybody’s interest; for reasons 
of initiative (prevention, response, follow-up) and accountability, it is imperative 
that it is clear what roles are assumed by what level, institution and Member State, 
respectively; 
•  Linked to the issue of responsibility is ownership, and how to avoid the Brussels’ 
blame game. In other words, how do we evade Member States (and EU 
institutions) claiming credit for action perceived to be handled well and blaming 
others when things go sour? 
•  ‘Credit’ and ‘blame’, as assigned by citizens or constituencies to individual 
Member State governments or 'the EU': Though it is at times assumed that 
something is either ‘thanks to’ or ‘the fault of’ a given Member State or ‘the EU’, 
we would argue that the two levels do not necessarily constitute a zero-sum game 
but could be mutually reinforcing. If so, this factor would have to be characterised 
as adding to its potential rather than representing a limit to EU consular crisis 
management cooperation as a means of EU public diplomacy;
116 
•  The gap between the political will and consular professionals on the ground: In 
some instances, there seems to be less reluctance among individuals 
professionally involved in consular crisis management than at the political level. 
Others have suggested that it could be the other way around, given that politicians 
can be enthusiastic about cooperation while consular professionals often are 
                                                 
116 An interesting, related question is whether ‘credit’ and ‘blame’, respectively, between the national and 
EU levels instead could be positively correlated, i.e. when a consular crisis is perceived as being positively 
handled, would both individual Member State governments and ‘the EU’ gain in positive standing in the 
eyes of the citizens and foreign audiences? This question is, however, outside the scope of this study. aware of the specific consular requirements and differences in responsibility and 
legislation between Member States;
117 
•  The nature of crises: In a crisis, communication can be a challenge in general, but 
particularly in situations where consular help is needed we have seen that EU 
citizens seem to prefer to be helped by somebody who understands their own 
language;
118 
•  National sensitivities and public perception: When, during the Asian tsunami, a 
German aircraft evacuated a number of UK citizens, a British tabloid happily 
proclaimed that ‘Luftwaffe Flies Brit Back Home’.
119 Assistance by other 
Member States can – at least lacking help from the own Member State – be 
welcome, but might also trigger questions about why the own Member State 
could not or did not provide this help; 
•  Growing expectations and the limits of governments’ responsibilities: If consular 
assistance is guaranteed by law in one or several Member States, but not in others, 
citizens are likely to compare their situation with states with a better level of 
protection, which might lead to governments having a difficult time explaining 
that there must be limits to the help it can provide; 
•  Differences in Member States’ resources and representation: While big Member 
States, such as France, Germany and the UK, have more than 100 missions in 
third countries, others have less than 10 (Estonia, Latvia, Malta and 
Luxembourg). In the event of a large crisis, this might lead to a situation that 
smaller Member States cannot handle, whereas bigger Member States with an 
extensive presence in third countries are afraid of so-called consular shopping, i.e. 
the risk of having to assist a disproportionate number of individuals from 
unrepresented Member States.
120 
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cooperation exist. But it is also remarkable how little has happened: 
 
17 years after the provision on European citizenship was introduced through the Treaty of 
Maastricht, and 14 years after the common decision 95/553/EC was agreed, consular 
crisis management cooperation on the EU level is still relatively limited. Public 
diplomacy initiatives in the area are even more incomplete: The Council Secretariat has 
established – to put it nicely – a very basic website, which still is said to be “Under 
construction”. The European Commission has printed a poster in 14,500 copies for a 
Union of almost half a billion citizens. The Commission has also proposed including a 
reference to Art. 20 TEC in EU citizens’ passports, as well as a URL – to a website which 
does not work. 
 
Almost five years after the tsunami and three years after the Lebanon crisis, in a time 
where EU citizens make 180 million trips annually, if consular crisis management 
cooperation were to be a serious public diplomacy/public affairs’ tool to bring Europe 
closer to its citizens (and increase the EU’s popularity abroad), a more concerted political 
will, common messages and joint action need to be established rapidly. List of References 
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